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Abstract
Adblocking tools like Adblock Plus continue to rise
in popularity, potentially threatening the dynamics of
advertising revenue streams. In response, a number of
publishers have ramped up efforts to develop and de-
ploy mechanisms for detecting and/or counter-blocking
adblockers (which we refer to as anti-adblockers), ef-
fectively escalating the online advertising arms race. In
this paper, we develop a scalable approach for identi-
fying third-party services shared across multiple web-
sites and use it to provide a first characterization of anti-
adblocking across the Alexa Top-5K websites. We map
websites that perform anti-adblocking as well as the en-
tities that provide anti-adblocking scripts. We study the
modus operandi of these scripts and their impact on pop-
ular adblockers. We find that at least 6.7% of websites in
the Alexa Top-5K use anti-adblocking scripts, acquired
from 12 distinct entities – some of which have a direct
interest in nourishing the online advertising industry.
1 Introduction
Today’s web ecosystem is largely driven by online
advertising. However, recent years have seen a large
number of users turn to adblocking and tracker-blocking
tools1 for the purposes of improving their web-browsing
experience, maintaining privacy, and more recently to
protect themselves against malware [21, 25]. With a
1While adblocking differs from tracker-blocking, to ease presentation,
we refer to tools that provide any of these properties as adblockers.
recent study estimating the number of active adblock
users to be 198M and revenue losses due to adblockers
at $22B [22], the threat posed by adblockers to the on-
line advertising revenue model has moved from mildly
concerning to existential. In response, publishers have
started to actively detect users of adblockers, and subse-
quently block them or otherwise coerce them to disable
the adblocker – in the rest of the paper, we refer to these
practices as anti-adblocking. Most recently, this practice
gained wide attention with the endorsement of the Inter-
net Advertising Bureau (IAB) when, in March 2016, it
released a primer on how to deal with users of adblock-
ers, as well as a semi open-source script2 for detecting
the use of adblockers [12]. The tension between key
stakeholders in this ecosystem – publishers, users, and
a plethora of intermediate beneficiaries – forms part of
what has been dubbed as the adblocking arms race [26].
Motivation. While incidents of anti-adblocking [3, 6,
24, 26], and the legality of such practices [4, 19, 28],
have received increasing attention, current understand-
ing thereof is limited to a few forums [3] and user-
generated reports [6]. As a result, we lack quantifi-
able insights into key questions such as: how preva-
lent nowadays are such practices on the Web? Are
certain categories of websites more likely to employ
anti-adblockers? Who are the main suppliers of anti-
adblocking services? What mechanisms do these em-
ploy to detect the presence of adblockers? Is it possible
for adblockers to counter-block anti-adblockers? What
2The script was only made available to members of the IAB.
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are common responses after positive detection of ad-
blockers and their impact on end-users? In this work,
we address these questions by presenting the first char-
acterization of anti-adblocking.
Roadmap. We start with characterizing anti-adblocking
on the Web by identifying anti-adblocking scripts across
Alexa Top-5K sites. To this end, we develop a scal-
able technique to identify popular third-party services
that are shared across multiple websites, and utilize it
to flag anti-adblocking scripts. We then map out the
entities that serve anti-adblocking scripts and the web-
sites that use these scripts. We find that at least 6.7%
of Alexa Top-5K websites conduct some form of anti-
adblocking by downloading 14 scripts from 12 unique
domains most of which belong to ad services, while
one specifically offers anti-adblocking services. Most
of the anti-adblocking websites represent popular cat-
egories such as news, blogs, and entertainment. We
manually visit sample websites from the anti-adblockers
and find that the arms race has already entered the next
round: at least one of three popular browser extensions
(AdBlock Plus, Ghostery, Privacy Badger) can counter-
block half of the anti-adblocking scripts. We conclude
with a discussion of the anti-adblocking arms race in
terms of ethics and legality, also enumerating existing
proposals that aim to achieve a sustainable and unintru-
sive online advertising model.
2 Related Work
Rafique et al. [23] measure anti-adblocking as an
incidental aspect of a broader study of malicious and
deceptive advertisements, malware and scams on free
live-streaming services. They find that anti-adblocking
scripts were used by 16.3% of the 1,000 domains they
crawled, which is a bit higher than what we find in
the Alexa Top-5K (6.7%), although not surprising given
their heavy use of deceptive ads.
Our paper also complements work quantifying and
characterizing non-transparent third-party web services,
as well as revealing users’ differential treatment. For
example, Ikram et al. [13] proposed a machine learn-
ing approach to characterize JavaScripts used for on-
line tracking and those used for providing website func-
tionality. Their work allows privacy-enhancing tools
to more selectively block JavaScripts without breaking
website functionality. Acar et al. [1] and Liu et al. [16]
measure the prevalence of tracking across large datasets
of websites, while Mayer [17] studies the effectiveness
of some adblocking and anti-tracking tools against those
sites. Khattak et al. [14] assess discrimination against
Tor users at the network and application layer. Various
studies investigate price discrimination [11, 20] and its
methods [7] employed by online marketplaces, and there
are other studies on filter bubbles – the effect where high
web personalization leads to users being locked in infor-
mation silos [10, 29].
All of these studies illuminate the nature and scale
of opaque practices on the web, informing our under-
standing of complex and multidimensional ecosystems.
Our work complements previous studies by present-
ing a novel technique to identify shared objects across
multiple websites at scale, and utilizing this approach
to provide a first look at how the Web employs anti-
adblocking techniques.
3 Methodology
This section presents our method for identifying
third-party services that are shared between multiple
websites. We describe the technique in the context of
identifying shared anti-adblocking JavaScripts (JS). The
premise of our approach is that by discovering similar
objects (in our case, JavaScripts) that are loaded by mul-
tiple websites, we can infer the presence of a common
third-party JS, its functionality and its source.
Crawler overview. We rely on a Selenium-based web
crawler to generate the set of JavaScripts to analyze.
We load each website in our dataset with four browser
modes – vanilla Firefox (with no extensions), Firefox
with AbBlock Plus, Firefox with Ghostery, and Firefox
with Privacy Badger. For each page load, we capture
screenshots, HTML source code, and responses to all
requests generated by the browser. We extract all the
text between <script> and </script> tags from
the HTML and label them as embedded JS. Similarly,
we detect all JS objects in the collected responses and la-
bel them as downloaded JS. In total, the Top-5K Alexa
websites generate over 200K individual JS files when
loaded with the vanilla Firefox browser.
Identifying JS objects with common sources. We for-
mulate our problem of finding groups of similar JS as a
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maximal clique finding problem [5]. We consider each
JS file loaded by a website to be a node in a graph. If
two nodes are within some margin of similarity of each
other (we define our similarity metric below), we say
there is an edge between them. We extract classes of JS
that have a common source by identifying all maximal
cliques in this graph. By intentionally focusing on find-
ing similar JS (rather than identical JS) we allow for the
grouping of objects that differ only slightly because they
contain website-specific identifiers, features and proper-
ties.
Choice of similarity metric and threshold. In order
to add an edge between two nodes in the graph (i.e., to
indicate that two JS files in two different websites are
similar), we need to define a metric for similarity, and a
suitable threshold for this metric. To measure the sim-
ilarity of two JS files, we use Term Frequency–Inverse
Document Frequency (TF-IDF) to generate a vector of
keyword weights for each JS file after filtering out JS
reserved words, such as function and var. We then
use the cosine similarity metric to measure the similarity
of the two keyword weight vectors. Similar approaches
using both TF-IDF and cosine similarity have been used
by the information retrieval community for topic identi-
fication and similarity checking of source-code [15,30].
We note that this method is particularly well suited to
our task compared to other string matching approaches
because it is:
• White-space insensitive: Many websites perform
script minification using different libraries, yield-
ing different indentation and white-spacing prac-
tices. Our approach is unaffected by these com-
plications.
• Position insensitive: In scripts that have several
functionalities (e.g., tracking and ad-block detec-
tion), the position of each specific function is irrel-
evant to the similarity score.
• Reasonably resistant to noise: Small changes (e.g.,
website specific identifiers) have little impact on
the final similarity score.
In order to determine a similarity score threshold, we
perform a series of experiments on a small dataset of
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Figure 1: Effect of the similarity threshold parameter on the
True Positive Rate (TPR) and the number of maximal cliques.
4.4K JS files extracted from the Alexa Top-100 web-
sites. In each experiment, we set a similarity thresh-
old between 0.40 and 1.00 and compute the cliques in
each of the corresponding graphs. We then manually in-
spect the cliques extracted at each threshold to identify
the fraction of cliques containing JS with identical func-
tionality and sources. Using this approach, we find that
at a similarity threshold of 0.80, 17/20 cliques returned
by our program contain scripts with identical functional-
ity and sources, i.e., achieving True Positive Rate (TPR)
of 0.85. In Figure 1, we illustrate the change in TPR
along with the number of cliques returned as the thresh-
old increases. Although thresholds above 0.90 yield
TPR=1.0, the number of cliques returned drops signif-
icantly, which will result in lower True Negative Rates
(TNR). Therefore, following a conservative stance, we
use a threshold of 0.80 for the remainder of our experi-
ments.
Improving scalability. Our approach involves comput-
ing the cosine similarity between each pair of keyword
weight vectors, thus requiring O(n2) vector multiplica-
tions for n JS files. Given the large number of JS files
used by websites (e.g., the Alexa Top-5K sites contained
over 200K JavaScripts), this may not scale with large
datasets. Therefore, we use a set of heuristically de-
veloped filters to eliminate comparisons between scripts
that are unlikely to ever be part of the same clique:
• Word-count filter: We avoid comparing scripts with
significant word-count difference. Specifically, if a
pair of scripts has a word-count ratio higher than
1.50, we assume that they are unlikely to be a part
of the same clique and set their similarity to 0.
• Embedded vs. downloaded script filter: JavaScript
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is either embedded in the source HTML for page-
specific functionality, or downloaded separately
from external sources to provide site-wide func-
tionality. We do not consider them as the same type
of identity thus we set their similarity to 0.
• Source filter: If two JavaScripts are fetched from
the exact same URL, we mark them as identical.
• JS domain filter: JavaScript can communicate with
external sources indicated by embedded URLs. We
assume that for any pair of scripts, if one communi-
cates with external sources and the other does not,
their functionality is different and set their similar-
ity score to 0.
Source and functionality identification. Once maxi-
mal cliques of similar scripts are identified, the content
and meta-data of each script in a clique is used to gen-
erate and log: (i) the FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain
Name) of the script’s source, (ii) FQDNs of external re-
sources utilized by the script, and (iii) keywords asso-
ciated with the script. In Section 4, we use these three
features, in addition to content of the script, to classify
cliques by functionality.
Method limitations. We acknowledge that our method
has a few limitations. First, our similarity metric will
fail to identify obfuscated JS code. Second, given that
we do not compare downloaded with embedded JS code,
we may fail to identify small cliques in which a re-
duced number of sites integrate an anti-adblocking JS
in a different way than is normal. Finally, our method
may fail to identify similarities between composed JS–
i.e., scripts that consist of multiple individual files down-
loaded as a single object. As a result, our method only
provides a lower-bound approximation of the usage of
anti-adblocking across websites. We plan on addressing
these limitations in future work.
4 Dataset and Results
We apply our clique detection methodology to the JS
objects fetched by our crawler using the vanilla Fire-
fox browser. We restrict our analysis to cliques of size
greater than 5 – i.e., JavaScripts shared by more than
5 sites in our dataset – as we are interested in identi-
fying scripts that are shared across many websites. We
Cliques Websites
Downloaded 1,373 3,619
Embedded 509 2,070
Trackers 456 2,741
Anti-Adblockers 22 335
Table 1: The number of total cliques (out of 1,882 found)
and those related to tracking and anti-adblocking, along with
the number of websites that incorporate these scripts (totalling
4,017 websites, computed over 200K downloaded and embed-
ded scripts).
acknowledge that this approach might fail to flag anti-
adblocking scripts utilized by individual or a small num-
ber of websites, and those used by a few websites in
the Alexa Top-5K but popular among websites ranked
above 5K. As shown in Table 1, we find 1,373 cliques
that are shared among 3,619 websites in the down-
loaded files, with an average of 232 websites per clique
(σ=365.6) and the largest clique having 1,320 websites
(which we find, via manual inspection, is a JS related to
jQuery). Among the embedded scripts, 509 cliques are
shared by 2,070 websites (µ=41.2 σ=48.9 max=261).
We manually analyze all the 1,882 cliques (corre-
sponding to 4,017 unique websites) identified for both
downloaded and embedded scripts, and tag them as
trackers (if they upload information such as IP addresses
and cookies to tracking companies), anti-adblockers (if
they check for the presence of adblockers), or others.
Manual analysis is performed by identifying external
libraries and function specific keywords used in the
scripts. We note that manual analysis of JS is a tedious
process that does not scale to a larger number of scripts,
therefore we leave as part of future work to investigate
ways to automate JS tagging.
We uncover 22 cliques used for anti-adblocking em-
ployed by 335 websites – about 6.7% of Alexa Top-5K
websites. We observe that Alexa Top-1K have 60 anti-
adblocking websites, and the number increases by about
70 websites for every additional 1K considered, reach-
ing 335 anti-adblocking websites in Top-5K. While
studying anti-adblockers, we also identify 456 tracking
cliques employed by about 54% of Alexa Top-5K, vali-
dating previous studies on the pervasiveness of tracking
over the Web [8].
Anti-adblocking by website categories. In Table 2, we
4
% Category % Category
19.5% General News 2.5% Pornography
9.3% Blogs/Wiki 2.5% Forum/Bulletin Boards
8.5% Entertainment 2.2% Technical/Business Forums
4.3% Internet Services 2.2% Potential Illegal Software
3.7% Sports 2.0% Online Shopping
3.7% Games 1.7% Portal Sites
3.2% Travel 1.7% Humor/Comics
3.2% Education/Reference 1.2% Social Networking
2.7% Business 1.2% Provocative Attire
2.5% Software/Hardware 1.2% Marketing/Merchandising
Table 2: Distribution of anti-adblocking websites by category
according to McAfee’s URL categorization.
report the categories of the 335 anti-adblocking web-
sites, using McAfee’s URL categorization service [18].
We find that anti-adblocking is common among a di-
verse mix of publishers, and prevalent among publish-
ers of “General News” (19.5%), “Blogs/Wiki” (9.3%),
and “Entertainment” (8.5%) categories, which represent
more than one third of all websites. Note that these cat-
egories are also among the most popular ones across
all Top-5K Alexa domains, although to a lesser extent
– respectively, 9.4%, 6.29%, and 5.4%. Whereas, other
popular categories among Top-5K domains (e.g., “In-
ternet services”, “Online Shopping”, “Business”, which
account for 20% of the Top-5K) are much less prevalent
in anti-adblocking websites.
Website response to detection of adblockers. In or-
der to assess how anti-adblocking websites behave once
they identify adblockers, we look at all the screen-
shots taken by our crawler, respectively, when using the
vanilla Firefox browser with no extensions and the Fire-
fox browser with AdBlock Plus enabled (which we as-
sume is more likely to be detected due to its popular-
ity [21]) .
We note cases where there is an explicit (i.e., warning
to disable adblocker) or a discrete (i.e., blank page via
AdBlock Plus, but normal appearance without) response
to adblocking. For these websites, we also view screen-
shots when accessed by the Firefox browser with each
of the following extensions: Ghostery, Privacy Badger,
and NoScript.
We find only 6 explicit and no discrete responses
to adblocking. Of the explicit responses, 3 are dis-
played by porn websites hosted by the same company
– MindGeek – and employ the same anti-adblocking
script downloaded from DoublePimp. The warning
is displayed for both AdBlock Plus and Ghostery. The
remaining 3 also employ the same script, but display dif-
ferent messages (only for AdBlock Plus) with the same
general theme, i.e., nudging the user to disable the ad-
blocker and/or support the website via subscription or
donation.
Some websites display adblocker warning to users af-
ter they engage in some form of activity, such as clicking
on links or scrolling. To capture such responses, we re-
peat the above exercise for screenshots taken after mim-
icking user activity – specifically, clicking on a random
link on the page, scrolling down to the bottom of the
newly loaded page, waiting three seconds, then scrolling
back up to the top of the page, waiting 5 seconds. While
the modified methodology validates our previous obser-
vations, we do not discover any new responses.
In the attempt of automating the analysis of websites’
response to anti-adblocking, we have also tried to use
image comparison tools, such as perceptual hashing.
However, this generates a high number of false positives
due to dynamic content on many sites as well as false
negatives since anti-adblocking warnings and messages
generate a relatively small visual difference.
How anti-adblockers work. Next, we manually in-
spect the 22 anti-adblocking scripts (14 downloaded and
8 embedded) aiming to understand how anti-adblocking
scripts detect adblockers. We note that of these only
the 14 downloaded scripts are actually useful as the
8 embedded scripts simply redirect to the downloaded
scripts. We find that anti-adblockers operate on a simple
premise: if a bait object (i.e., an object that is expected
to be blocked by ad-blockers – e.g., a JS or DIV element
named ads) on the publisher’s website is missing when
the page loads, the script concludes that the user has an
adblocker installed.
Specifically, the anti-adblocker detects adblockers by
one of the following approaches: (1) The anti-adblocker
injects a bait advertisement container element (e.g.,
DIV), and then compares the values of properties rep-
resenting dimensions (height and width) and/or vi-
sual status (display) of the container element with
the expected values when properly loaded. (2) The anti-
adblocker loads a bait script that modifies the value of a
variable, and then checks the value of this variable in the
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Domain Description #Sites ABP Gh PB
pagefair.com Anti-adblocking 20 3 7 3
googleadservices.com Ads 61 7 7 7
googlesyndication.com Ads 13 7 7 7
taboola.com Ads 36 7 3 3
outbrain.com Ads 10 7 3 3
ensighten.com Ads 6 7 3 7
hotjar.com Analytics 9 7 7 7
doublepimp.com Pornography 8 7 3 7
tacdn.com Travel 8 7 7 7
cloudflare.com CDN 50 7 7 3
cloudfront.net CDN 6 7 7 7
ytimg.com Content/Ads 108 7 7 7
Table 3: Domains from which anti-adblocking scripts are
downloaded and #websites employing them. The table’s right
side reports whether AdBlock Plus, Ghostery, and Privacy
Badger counter-block anti-adblocking scripts from these do-
mains.
main anti-adblocking script to verify that the bait script
was properly loaded. If the bait object is determined
to be absent, the anti-adblocking script concludes that
an adblocker is present. To track whether the user has
turned off the adblocker after being prompted to do so,
the anti-adblocker periodically runs the ad-block check
and stores the last recorded status in the user’s browser
using a cookie or local storage.
Anti-adblocker suppliers. We analyze the source
code of the 14 anti-adblocking scripts and the domains
from which these are downloaded aiming to infer the
suppliers of these scripts. The remaining 8 embed-
ded scripts redirect to anti-adblocking scripts served by
Cloudflare and Taboola. Our analysis is summa-
rized in Table 3. We also include a description of these
domains – based on the information available on their
official websites, Google search, and McAfee URL cat-
egorization service [18] – as well as the number of web-
sites in our dataset that employ the anti-adblocker.
At the top we find Pagefair, a company special-
ized in anti-adblocking services, followed by a number
of domains related to Google, Taboola, Outbrain
and Ensighten. Overall the anti-adblockers down-
loaded from these 5 domains are employed by 48% of
all the 315 websites employing anti-adblockers. We
note that these domains are direct beneficiaries of anti-
adblocking as these inherently thrive on the prevalence
of online advertisements. Though not directly related to
online advertisement, the ability to detect adblockers is
a useful capability for the analytics company HotJar.
We also find two cases where the anti-adblocking
script is shared by entities in the same domain or busi-
ness: TripAdvisor (tacdn.com) distributes the script
to its 8 websites with different country code top-level
domains. Adult websites, all of which are hosted by
MindGeek, turn to DoublePimp for anti-adblocking.
Two anti-adblocking scripts are pulled from popular
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), but we could not
determine their original supplier. Finally, ytimg (a
content server associated with YouTube) serves a script
that has the ability to detect if ads were properly loaded,
however, it is not clear how it uses this information.
Adblocker response to being blocked. There is anec-
dotal evidence that the adblocking arms race has en-
tered the next level: some adblockers can detect anti-
adblockers and counter-block them [27]. To test for
this behaviour, we visit a sample website for each anti-
adblocking script via AdBlock Plus, Ghostery and Pri-
vacy Badger over Chrome web browser. We repeat the
experiment three times and monitor all HTTP requests
generated when loading the website using Chrome’s De-
veloper Tools. We infer that adblocker can counter-
block if the request to fetch anti-adblocking script fails
to be initiated. As reported in Table 3, half of the
12 anti-adblocking suppliers are blocked by at least
one adblocker. Ghostery and Privacy Badger detect 4
anti-adblockers each, while AdBlock Plus detects only
1. Anti-adblocking scripts served by Taboola and
Outbrain are blocked by both Ghostery and Privacy
Badger, PageFair scripts by both AdBlock Plus and
Privacy Badger, while Doublepimp, Ensighten
and Cloudflare scripts by at most one of the three
adblockers. We note that the anti-adblocking suppliers
that are never detected are related to content distribution,
Google ad services, analytics, or site-wide scripts.
5 Discussion
The adblocking arms race involves a plethora of play-
ers: between publishers and consumers, a jostling array
of intermediaries compete to deliver ads, mostly sup-
ported by business models that involve taking a cut of
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the resultant advertising revenue. At the heart of this
rich ecosystem lie important questions regarding the le-
gality and ethics of adblocking and anti-adblocking.
The legality of adblocking is potentially contestable
under laws about anti-competitive business conduct and
copyright infringement. To date, only Germany has
tested these arguments in court, with adblockers win-
ning most [4], but not all of the cases [19]. On the other
hand, anti-adblocking in the EU might in turn breach
Article 5(3) of the Privacy and Electronic Communica-
tions Directive 2002/58/EC, as it involves interrogating
an end-user’s terminal equipment without consent [28].
Many consider adblocking to be an ethical choice for
consumers and publishers to consider from both an indi-
vidual and societal perspective. In reality, however, both
sides have resorted to radical measures to achieve their
goals. The Web has empowered publishers and advertis-
ers to track, profile and target users in a way that is un-
precedented in the physical realm [8]. In addition, pub-
lishers are inadvertantly and increasingly serving up ma-
licious ads [25]. This has resulted in the rise of adblock-
ing, which in turn has led publishers to employ anti-
adblocking. The core issue is to get the balance right
between ads and information: publishers turn to anti-
adblocking to force consumers to reconsider the default
blocking of ads for earnest ad-supported publishers but
defaults are difficult to shift at scale. Nevertheless, those
publishers will fail if they do not redress in a fundamen-
tal way the reasons that brought consumers to adblock-
ers in the first place. There exist proposals to provide a
compromise, such as privacy-friendly advertising [9] as
well as mechanisms to give users more control over ads
and trackers they are exposed to [2, 31]. Our work ex-
tends these efforts by providing quantified insights into
anti-adblocking, to inform policy that can improve upon
the current blocking/counter-blocking deadlock.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented a measurement-based analysis
aimed to provide a first look at the arms race between
adblocking and anti-adblocking. We found that at least
6.7% of Alexa Top-5K websites, mostly in popular cat-
egories like news, blogs, and entertainment, engage in
some form of anti-adblocking. The arms race has al-
ready entered the next level, as at least one of three
popular browser extensions – AdBlock Plus, Ghostery,
Privacy Badger – can evade half of the anti-adblocking
scripts in our dataset. In future work, we plan to extend
our measurements beyond the Alexa Top-5K websites,
and experiment with crowdsourced and/or automated
mechanisms to tag JavaScript by functionality and to as-
sess publisher response to detection of adblockers.
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